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HIDDEN RACIAL BIAS: WHY WE NEED TO TALK 
WITH JURORS ABOUT FERGUSON 
Patrick C. Brayer 
As recent tragic events confirm, issues of race frame our national 
identity and define our capacity to achieve true equality for all individuals. 
By its very nature and traditions, the law is a profession tasked with 
confronting inequality and discrimination in our society. As issues of race 
continue to influence our communities, nation, and world, the legal 
profession will be charged with leading future discussions on how prejudice 
and bias affect our clients. Unfortunately, as legal professionals, we still 
struggle with the question of whether to talk about race in voir dire.1 This 
essay discusses our obligation as judges, academics, and practitioners to 
understand how unconscious racial bias exists in the hidden belief systems 
of many, if not all, jurors. These actors must also recognize that open 
dialogue in jury selection is a proven strategy against the effects of 
individual undetected prejudice. Furthermore, attorneys must concede 
hidden bias in themselves before fully comprehending the devastating 
impacts of racial biases. The events of the last four months in Ferguson, 
Missouri have exposed potential jurors to experiences dominated by issues 
of race. The opinions, beliefs, and prejudices of future fact-finders will be 
greatly shaped by how they perceive these events and interpret the issues. 
I. “CLASHES, CHAOS” 
“POLICE AGAIN USE TEAR GAS ON FERGUSON PROTESTERS” 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH 
8-18-2014 
On August 18, 2014, I found myself in a routine situation for a career 
public defender: preparing to select a jury in a criminal case by questioning 
the citizens of St. Louis County, Missouri. Inside of the courtroom, the 
setting was normal, but the scene outside the courthouse was anything but 
ordinary. Nine days previously, less than ten miles from where my venire 
panel sat, eighteen-year-old Michael Brown was shot and killed by a police 
officer in nearby Ferguson, Missouri. National and local media had 
descended upon Ferguson and broadcasted images of nightly confrontations 
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between police and demonstrators who firmly believed that an unarmed 
African-American teenager had been unjustifiably gunned down. Social, 
Internet, television, and print media were flooded with stories and images of 
grief, looting, tear gas, political disputes, tactical teams, and burning 
buildings. 
Since the shooting, my assembled panel of potential jurors were 
exposed to—and in some cases participated in—a national debate on many 
issues, including how law enforcement and local courts treat people of color 
and the rights of law enforcement to use force to defend themselves and 
their communities. On this Monday morning of scheduled jury service, 
these citizens entered a courthouse that just a few days before—and again 
the following day—was guarded by a sizeable police presence armed with 
riot gear and hand ties, poised to repel protesters. 
The potential jurors before me all had opinions and experiences 
concerning how minorities are generally treated by police. Many held views 
on how police and citizens treated each other on the streets of Ferguson. As 
a litigator, I needed to know the beliefs, attitudes, and biases of my 
potential jurors. But I still harbored a very private concern: that this subject 
was too controversial and too personal, and would become a distraction 
from the trial. I feared the jurors would resent me and my client for 
introducing the issue. 
It was hypocritical of me to consider avoiding a dialogue about 
Ferguson with prospective jurors, seeing as I have publicly preached the 
importance of discussing issues of race in voir dire.2 Race was not a major 
issue in my case, but how my jury viewed law enforcement was an 
important concern. Yet, I still harbored doubts about saying the word 
“Ferguson.” 
An attorney’s own private fears are just one roadblock preventing him 
or her from discussing race during voir dire. Some judges prohibit any 
mention of race by litigators.3 Thus, structural, strategic, and emotional 
barriers prevent litigators from engaging in an open discussion of race in 
voir dire. But it remains critically important that actors in the justice 
system, such as myself, overcome these barriers and address issues of race 
during the jury selection process. To emphasize this point, this essay 
surveys psychological research and jury studies that indicate just how large 
a role race can play in jurors’ decisionmaking processes. 
II. VOIR DIRE AND UNCONSCIOUS BIAS 
In 2006, social psychologist Samuel Sommers studied the impact of 
race-related voir dire questions on jurors by simulating realistic trial 
 
2  Patrick C. Brayer, Batson, Empowerment and New Jury Models: The Case for ‘Open Inquiry,’ 
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conditions for mock juries and recording the responses of participants.4 
Individuals “were less likely to vote guilty before deliberating and gave 
lower estimates of the likelihood of the Black defendant’s guilt” when 
asked race-related questions in voir dire.5 His results suggest that engaging 
a juror with questions about race diminishes the effects of embedded 
individual bias on the trial process. A juror’s decisionmaking system is 
somehow influenced when reminded to render a judgment “free from 
prejudice.”6 Thus, a simple interactive reminder to a juror to consciously 
put prejudice aside appears to invite a self-assessment of the individual’s 
bias and may produce discernable results. Individuals generally fail to 
perceive their own biases until they are requested to consider issues of race 
and encouraged to articulate how these issues have framed their experiences 
and belief system.7 Individual and interactive prompting by an attorney 
during voir dire appears to diminish the impact of individual hidden bias, 
allowing the facts of the case and the instructions of the court to emerge as 
the dominant influence on juror decisionmaking. 
In addition to the work of researchers, a growing number of legal 
scholars have identified “race-related voir dire” as a way to moderate a 
“juror[’s] own racial attitudes” by making race “salient.”8 This area of 
scholarship reframes the goal of voir dire to be the self-identification of 
implicit bias by each individual juror.9 Voir dire can play an important role 
in defining principles of fairness and equality for each member on the 
panel, encouraging jurors to avoid subconscious personal prejudice. The 
interactive nature of discussing the issue of prejudice with jurors makes the 
goal of avoiding bias “contextually” important, and allows the court or 
litigator to issue “strong normative goals to avoid bias.”10 When conducted 
“in an unhurried, relaxed, and non-judgmental environment,” the resulting 
dialogue can diminish the impact of “racial attitudes.”11 
Racial identity research also explains why the events in Ferguson are a 
necessary subject for jury selection. When individuals are confronted with 
an event involving racial issues, their ego selects a “racial identity status,” 
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allowing them to interpret the event.12 Unfortunately, this identity can lack 
maturity, and if not confronted with new and meaningful information about 
race, individuals remain at their original, ego-motivated identity status.13 
Depending on the maturity of a person’s racial identity, their status could 
range from being oblivious to the existence of racism in society to a belief 
system where they self-identify and confront individual racist beliefs.14 
The tragic death of Michael Brown and all that followed triggered a 
quest within many to protect their sense of self and rationalize events absent 
any substantive dialogue. Because the issues raised by Ferguson will persist 
in the minds of many jurors, a race-related voir dire acknowledging hidden 
bias is essential when promoting prejudice-free proceedings.15 
Unfortunately, some judges prohibit any mention of race by litigators. 
When a judge bans discussions of race during courtroom proceedings, the 
system facilitates the continued existence of hidden prejudice in the fact-
finding process. If race-based attitudes are informing jurors to an extent that 
is outcome-determinative, legal professionals must be willing to facilitate 
an open exchange of all beliefs in the jury selection process. But as legal 
professionals, are we uncomfortable with the concept of unconscious bias? 
Is it easier to blame unfairness on the overt bigotry of a few, rather than 
accept the existence of implicit bias in everyone—even ourselves? 
III. HIDDEN BIAS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
In 2010, Shankar Vedantam explored the world of “the hidden brain” 
and concluded that the human brain is “designed to be biased.”16 Individuals 
distinguish differences in individual faces as a mechanism of survival.17 Our 
unconscious mind allows us to make quick judgments regarding the 
thousands of seemingly identical faces we witnessed as developing 
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infants.18 Vedantam argues that white Americans are some of the least 
skilled in cross-cultural and interracial identification because of the 
ubiquitous worldwide exposure to white American faces through television 
and other media.19 “In criminal justice settings, interracial eyewitness 
identifications are far more prone to error than situations where witnesses 
and suspects belong to the same race.”20 Unfortunately, the American legal 
system may be the first to deny the existence of a hidden bias, a denial 
“premised on the notion that deliberate and conscious thinking are all that 
matter.”21 
The developing “hidden brain” is programmed to learn through 
repeated observations of our world and is prompted to make unconscious 
judgments based on associations and generalities.22 As infants, our 
unconscious learning absorbs an American culture where children see 
thousands of observed interactions, marriages, and friendships segregated 
by race.23 The hidden brain “conclude[s] that there must be an unspoken 
rule in society that forces whites to marry other whites, because everywhere 
[it] look[s], most of the white husbands seem to be married to white 
wives.”24 Even when conscious learning is used to counter the prejudicial 
effects of hidden bias, cultural messages repeatedly communicate to the 
developing brain that people of color are different from people who are 
white.25 
Researchers have linked this existence of hidden bias to examples of 
inconsistent sentencing in the criminal justice system. Psychologists at 
Stanford University found that an individual’s skin tone and other features 
played a role in sentencing.26 Researchers asked “a large group of 
independent people who knew nothing about the cases” to rank the faces of 
individuals convicted of circumstances “serious enough to warrant the death 
penalty” on the “degree to which they looked stereotypically black.”27 
Individuals who appeared more “stereotypically black” were more than 
twice as likely to have received the death penalty.28 Researchers also 
concluded the same sentencing disparities did not exist when the defendant 
 
18  See id. 
19  Id. at 64. 
20  Id. at 66. 
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and victim belonged to the same race.29 Researchers noted that “[s]omething 
about black-on-white crime activated unconscious stereotypes that linked 
criminality with race in the minds of jurors.”30 
 Vedantam concluded that inconsistent treatment of black defendants by 
the criminal justice system is unlikely to be the result of mass deliberate 
bigotry and prejudice on the part of judges, lawyers, and jurors.31 A more 
likely explanation is that unconscious bias accumulates and may influence 
well-intentioned people to render unfair judgments.32 Compounding the 
problem are members of our legal system who refuse to accept the impact 
of hidden prejudice, assuming that “biased outcomes result from deliberate 
bias and that such errors can be overcome by setting up a confrontational 
system where prosecutors and defense attorneys keep one another honest.”33 
Because of this presumption, our system of justice “is designed to fail 
regularly.”34 
If openly discussing issues of race is an essential step in the self-
identification of individual prejudice, why are legal professionals reluctant 
to engage in a jury selection process that considers the existence of hidden 
bias? The answer to this question may be rooted in the following premise: 
to find unconscious prejudice in others, we must accept the existence of our 
own individual hidden bias. When confronted with issues involving race, 
our ego selects a dominant racial identity status to interpret the event.
35
 The 
selection of a status protects our “sense of well-being and self-esteem.”36 As 
legal professionals, we should be willing to mature in our own personal 
racial identity status by acknowledging that hidden bias exists in all 
individuals—including ourselves. We should not let our profession fail to 
evolve because of a system-wide reluctance to engage our jurors and 
ourselves in conversations about racism, bias, and prejudice.  
IV. REFLECTIONS FOLLOWING THE GRAND JURY DECISION 
I walked through a closed, barricaded, and relatively empty St. Louis 
County Court and Justice Center the morning after the grand jury decision 
on the case of Michael Brown’s death. As I observed the empty halls, I 
reflected on how a normal practice day in the life of a legal community had 
come to a complete stop because of events on the streets—arguably linked 
to a lack of a meaningful national dialogue on issues of race, prejudice, and 
bias. I noted the absence of the normal assembly of lawyers, typically 
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engaged in spirited discussions about their clients, and I remembered how 
my colleagues are very effective at promoting nonjudgmental but 
meaningful discussions between individuals of different beliefs when they 
select a jury. I also considered the week to follow when thousands of 
potential jurors will descend on courthouses around the nation, fresh from 
holiday gatherings but consumed with thoughts about what they observed 
the previous week in Ferguson and St. Louis County, Missouri. I realized as 
one practitioner, I can’t change the entire voir dire process or lead a national 
debate, but I can change what I discuss with individual jurors. 
As a profession, we can take certain important steps to remain relevant 
in the face of current events. First, we should discuss the importance of 
acknowledging issues of race and bias in voir dire. My thoughts have been 
communicated in this piece, but I appreciate the concerns and insights 
expressed by Professor Forman in her companion essay37 and eagerly await 
new scholarship on both sides of this question. Second, we need to identify 
and eliminate the legal obstacles and emotional barriers that will prevent a 
practitioner from engaging in a dialogue about race. Professor Joy’s essay 
speaks to the duty of lawyers to identify when and how they should discuss 
bias in voir dire.38 I strongly agree with his point that litigators must 
confront their individual fears of addressing race with jurors.39 Third, 
practitioners need to succeed at what they do best as a community of 
professionals by advancing and standardizing a trial skill: the effective 
questioning of jurors about hidden bias, prejudice, and race. Litigators of all 
disciplines currently rank among the best at moderating and welcoming 
relaxed, insightful dialogues about individual beliefs. By taking these steps, 
practitioners and the legal profession as a whole can both protect clients and 
contribute to a much-needed conversation that will help return relevance 
and life to every courthouse. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Open, ugly, and dangerous racism against people of color still exists 
today and the legal profession must continue to fight against its existence in 
and impact on our society. However, a lack of outward bigotry does not 
excuse lawyers from being unmindful of the biases that lurk within. 
Michael Brown’s death reminded us that issues of race, income inequality, 
and law enforcement continue to dominate our society. Potential jurors will 
arrive at the courthouse doors with a belief system and subconscious 
informed by their race-related experiences, and a perceived narrative based 
on current events. Because many of our potential jurors will be impacted in 
different ways by this tragedy, we must identify and discuss hidden bias in 
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voir dire and allow the events in Ferguson to serve as a catalyst for honest 
dialogue—specifically, an open dialogue with our jurors and a reflective 
dialogue with ourselves. 
 
